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Abstract
Martin Powell makes the point that the death of the National Health Service (NHS) is constantly asserted without 
criteria. This article suggests that the NHS is many things, which makes criteria unstable.  The alignment of interests 
in the structure of the NHS enables both overheated rhetoric and political strength, and that pluralization of 
provision might actually undermine that alignment over time. 
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Readers of mystery novels will be familiar with the setup: a murder is said to have been committed, but there is no corpse. Without a body there can be no investigation. 
In novels, this is a setup for an intrepid private investigator 
or uncompromising police officer to start investigating. In 
politics, Martin Powell’s article suggests, it is more common 
to assert the murder, skip the investigation, and go straight to 
the prosecution.1 We do not know how to tell if the National 
Health Service (NHS) has been killed, which makes it hard to 
identify the weapon or nail the murderer, but lots of people 
are sure there was a murder and have ideas about who that 
murderer might be.
1. What Is the NHS?
Powell argues that the “criterion” and “template for evaluation” 
of claims about the death of the NHS are unclear. We cannot 
know whether the NHS is dead, let alone who killed it, without 
some clarity about what its death would mean. 
These analytic problems might be disguising something a bit 
bigger. What, exactly, is the NHS? Is it a set of rights, a sector of 
the economy, a giant organization, a budget line, an employer, 
a set of shared expectations, or a million ill-managed public 
employees? 
The answer, as with most large social organizations, is all of 
the above. The very multidimensionality of the NHS makes 
it hard to identify criteria and evaluative templates for its 
death. For example, if it is a mechanism supporting a right 
to healthcare, then our attention is directed to legal rights 
and the duty of the government to provide healthcare. Words 
about duty or responsibility to provide take on a big meaning 
in the legalistic world of rights because they seem to make 
rights tangible. If it is a large organization, then we might 
think about its management and staff and be wary of any 
threat to its organizational integrity and structure. 
Furthermore, many of these characteristics are difficult to 
divide into binaries. Quality of care cannot be broken into 
good and bad care. The NHS could remain a big organization 
delivering free care at the point of access, but if the quality of 
care were to deteriorate, would there be a point at which we 
could say it had got so bad that the NHS was dead? Likewise, 
public provision might be a core feature of the NHS, but it 
has never been entirely public. What amount of non-public 
provision, what number of privately employed staff, what 
growth rate in NHS spending on private providers constitutes 
a break? 
In other words, the NHS is necessarily many things, and the 
meanings are always shifting because they are in the hands 
of many people whose preoccupations, desires, thoughts 
and preferences differ and shift over time. Some reasons to 
love the NHS, such as its contribution to the economies and 
middle classes of poor places, are rarely articulated in politics. 
Others, such as its ability to rescue a troubled neonate without 
bankrupting the parents, are more commonly articulated. 
Those who dislike the NHS rarely articulate a principled 
objection to it. They instead focus on trying to introduce 
more market forces and profit motivations (with justifications 
dating to Adam Smith) into a provision that they insist will 
remain free and universal. 
In fact, a number of figures in government since 2010, 
including the people who led the Liberal Democrats during 
the first Cameron government and the current Conservative 
Secretary of State for Health, Jeremy Hunt, have called for 
the abolition of the NHS.2-4 The favored replacement scheme 
of Hunt and his coauthors was a voucher arrangement that 
people could use to purchase healthcare. Conservatives the 
world over have learned that attacking universal welfare state 
programs head on is dangerous and have turned to making 
their operations more conservative in some way, leaving the 
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programs alone while reducing benefits, reducing downward 
redistribution and trying to introduce opportunities for 
profit.5 The plans of these leading politicians fits with the 
basic thrust of conservative, liberal policies worldwide, but 
they are oddly likely to actually call for the abolition of the 
NHS, even if their replacement “social insurance” or voucher 
schemes are hazy. 
2. The Usefulness of Criteria
Given that the NHS is many things, it is not clear what 
plausible criteria might be in even the most dispassionate 
sense. But the people who speak of the death of the NHS 
are not dispassionate. Powell’s targets are engaged in formal 
politics (eg, the Labour party) or are highly political, such as 
campaigning journalist John Lister or campaigning academic 
Allyson Pollock. They use the kind of rhetoric that works in 
politics. If we start demanding clear criteria and evaluative 
templates from politicians and campaigners, we will be 
frustrated. 
It is good academic practice to be clear about concepts, 
but it is not always clear that it is good political practice. 
Political language is often instrumental, intended to achieve 
an objective such as promotion of a particular model of 
health services. In such language, ambiguity, hyperbole, and 
negativity are crucial tools. Ambiguity allows the speaker to 
avoid challenges or opportunistically expand the argument’s 
scope. Hyperbole, meanwhile, can seem necessary to break 
through the noise and distractions of everyday life. When 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat members of Parliament 
(MPs) call for replacing the NHS with something else, they 
are making a dramatic political statement in just the same way 
Powell’s targets are. Negativity, finally, is useful because of the 
well-known human tendency to dwell on the negative and on 
losses. All three suggest that hazy arguments about the ill-
defined death of the NHS are to be expected in politics so long 
as the NHS is tangible and popular enough for them to work. 
3. Why This Rhetoric?
The question then is: why should rhetoric about killing the 
NHS be so popular? Conservative politician Nigel Lawson 
was not alone when he said the NHS was the “closest thing 
the English have to a religion.”6 Speculatively, the reason is 
that the NHS is benign in the way all healthcare is benign 
(bad things are rarely anybody’s intention), and it addresses 
people in a time of need, just like a church. Unlike the Church 
of England, with which it shares nationwide pretensions and 
infrastructure, it is close to unavoidable. One can get married 
outside a church, but it is hard to avoid sharing major life 
events such as birth and death with the NHS. Even those 
whose preference is to go private will use NHS resources as 
they do so and will return completely to its embrace if they 
need oncological or neonatolological treatment. Given its 
many advantages – healthcare without a serious financial 
burden is something anybody can appreciate – it is easy to see 
how it could be possible to become quite misty-eyed about it. 
If one’s politics appreciate solidarity and redistribution from 
richer to poorer, let alone public sector workers, then the 
emotional case for the NHS becomes stronger yet.
In other words, the NHS contains 2 key terms in its name: 
National and Service. Service means it is a big public sector 
organization comparable to the military or the Environment 
Agency; National means it is a project for and of the entire 
nation and is redistributive between the more and less 
fortunate. 
The common denominator of attacks on the NHS, such as that 
of  Hunt and his colleagues, is precisely a dislike of the “Service” 
in NHS – the sense that it is not just a right to healthcare at the 
point of use, but also a very large public organization. They are 
less likely to say if they resist the “National” if that means that 
the big public service is also one whose effect is redistributive 
as well. Given the clear attitudes towards redistribution of 
many English Conservatives, the appeal of voucher schemes 
probably includes less redistribution. The NHS was like many 
creatures of 1940s Labour: a big public organization with 
some intent to produce equity. As such it is always vulnerable 
in a political culture where many no longer have an intuitive 
sympathy for such organizations or their goals. 
From this perspective, it is understandable why writers such 
as Pollock and Lister see infringement on the “Service” aspect 
of NHS as an attack on the NHS. When Labour under Blair 
focused on the idea that the NHS should be free and universal 
at the point of service, it was leaving out public provision. 
New Labour’s idea was to downplay the Service aspect of 
the NHS in order to strengthen its National character, using 
competition to improve its efficiency and customer service 
so that the middle classes would continue to support it 
rather than becoming focused on it as a public employer. 
For those who see the Service itself as a crucial part of its 
identity, and who see that Service ethos as a powerful force 
for the preservation of the NHS, the result is that Blair’s ideas 
approached treason in the face of Conservative attack. 
Naturally, those who like the Service in NHS include unions 
such as the British Medical Association (BMA), but it also 
appeals to something deeper. In the broader politics of the 
welfare state, part of the cross-class appeal of social insurance is 
that it need not be redistributive. It can be made redistributive, 
as it is in most social health insurance countries, but it can 
also be made an effective instrument of insurance that does 
not redistribute, as is the case in pension politics and used 
to be the case in German health insurance. The NHS and 
similar systems unite redistribution and insurance in a way 
that is difficult to disentangle. Tax financing of a universal 
right to healthcare insures people against the consequences of 
ill health, something anybody of any class can appreciate, but 
also redistributes from those with more money to those with 
worse health.7 
Furthermore, health sectors around the world have no 
shortage of effective interest groups, but the NHS aligns the 
preferences of a wide variety of groups that might not be 
united in defense of public provision. Doctors’ unions cannot 
be assumed to have a shared interest in widespread access 
to healthcare. A system in which they fight for the NHS as 
doughtily as they do is probably sturdier than the international 
norm in which their defense of their members’ pay and 
conditions does not sustain universal healthcare access.
Welfare states are partly held together by institutional 
mechanisms that bind personal interests such as paychecks and 
income security into larger political forces for redistribution. 
The NHS is one such mechanism, and the result is that there 
is a powerful political motivation to preserve the Service in 
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NHS. That motivation transfers into powerful motivation to 
defend it against the sorts of contracting, competition, and 
plural provision schemes that are very common, lucrative, 
and particularly admired by right wing governments saddled 
with welfare states they would not have chosen. The appeal 
to such strong language is plausible because the NHS unites 
interests of people in almost every class as consumers but 
also producers. 
It also suggests that the critics have a point. If the distinctive 
thing about the NHS is the way it aligns the interests of people 
within the big organization with the right to healthcare, then 
pluralizing provision might indeed be a long-run way to 
weaken the proponents of universality and redistribution in 
health. A fragmented, pluralized “NHS” full of small charity 
providers, consultants, and private sector providers might not 
have the same symbolic power or alignment of self-interested 
and altruistic forces behind it. Dramatic statements about 
the death of the NHS, or the superiority of vouchers, might 
be the suitably hyperbolic way of talking about such matters 
in politics.
4. The Political Distinctiveness of the NHS
The NHS is distinctive then, and can be defended, in a way 
that any functioning national health service system can 
be defended: as a tangible, visible, sign that we are all in it 
together, and a redistributive service that is hard to make 
less redistributive. That characteristic is built into its design. 
It couples insurance and redistribution in a way that social 
insurance schemes make complex and optional, and in a way 
that voucher schemes obscure. The United States’ Veterans 
Health Administration has a similar tangibility and loyalty 
(and high level of quality), and it is probably no accident that 
it works much like the NHS. 
The NHS shows us that while there are many reasons to stop 
caring about the basic Bismarck/Beveridge distinction, there 
are still some reasons to keep caring. Basic characteristics of 
national health services make the national tangible in the 
service, make universality attractive to the middle classes, 
make redistribution part of the income of well off people 
like doctors, and align the gratitude of patients with a single, 
concrete, organization wearing a blue logo. We do not know 
how much we can unravel these closely knitted interests 
without losing the emotional, political, and functional defense 
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